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William of Poitiers’s Gesta Guillelmi, written shortly after the Norman Conquest of England, 
remains surprisingly neglected, especially by historians. He is generally regarded primarily as 
a classical stylist who employed classical references to decorate his panegyric of William of 
Normandy. Poitiers’ use of classical allusion was, however, far from superficial. In arguing 
for William’s legitimacy as king of England, Poitiers addresses a wider audience than is 
generally acknowledged, and appeals directly to the fears, expectations and values of his day. 
The article examines his three most sustained allusions to classical heroes of naval enterprises 
and conquest – Caesar, Aeneas and Theseus – as key components of the memory of the 
Norman Conquest, demonstrating that each allusion makes a specific moral and political 
point. Poitiers is a case study for medieval authorial ingenuity in applying classicism to the 
problems of the present. 
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William of Poitiers (d. c.1090), writing in Normandy shortly after the Norman Conquest of 
England, has continued to be regarded primarily as a classical stylist who employed classical 
references to decorate and enhance his unqualified panegyric of William of Normandy: the 
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Gesta Guillelmi (c.1071–7).1 Although the Gesta is valued for its perspectives on Anglo-
Norman warfare and lordship, Poitiers is regularly charged with intemperance in his 
classicising praise of William. The Gesta has been described as ‘nauseatingly sycophantic’,2 
lacking in honesty,3 written primarily to flatter both William and himself,4 and as a work 
characteristic of ‘pretentious authors working at a distance on a vague and confused story’.5 
Because of this unreserved condemnation of Poitiers’ integrity and knowledge, his reputation 
as a historian has suffered – as has, by extension, the reputation and nature of classical 
scholarship in eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe. 
In the twelfth century, Orderic Vitalis praised Poitiers’ multiplicity of skills and 
experience.6 In an important but largely ignored study, Jeanette M. A. Beer has described in 
detail how Poitiers employed classical auctores to provide a sophisticated rhetorical model 
for the Gesta,7 and Dominique Barthélemy has proposed that Poitiers’ work provides some of 
the earliest evidence of nascent chivalrous thought in medieval Europe.8 Yet although the 
Gesta is one of the few contemporary sources for the Norman Conquest, it has remained 
                                                 
1 The following abbreviations are used in this paper: GG: William of Poitiers, The Gesta Guillelmi of Poitiers, 
eds. R.H.C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
William of Poitiers is referred to hereafter ‘Poitiers’, to avoid confusion with William of Normandy, 
who is referred to as ‘William’. 
2 John Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, in Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Allen Brown, 
eds. Christopher Harper-Bill and others (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1989), 141–58 (141); cf. David Bates, 
William the Conqueror (Stroud: Tempus, 2004), 68. 
3 George Garnett, Conquered England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4; idem, ‘Coronation and 
Propaganda: Some Implications of the Norman Claims to the Throne of England in 1066’, Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 5th series, 36 (1986): 91–116 (95). 
4 R.H.C. Davis, ‘William of Poitiers and his History of William the Conqueror’, in The Writing of History in the 
Middle Ages: Essays Presented to R.W. Southern, eds. R.H.C. Davis and J.M. Wallace-Hadrill (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 71–100 (72). 
5 Frank Barlow, ‘The Carmen de Hastingae proelio’, in Studies in International History: Essays Presented to W. 
Norton Medlicott, eds. K. Bourne and D.C. Watt (London: Longmans, 1967), 35–67 (44, 61–3). 
6 Orderic Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall. 6 vols. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969–1980), 2: 258–61 (iv.ii.217–18). 
7 Jeanette M. A. Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth in the Middle Ages (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1981), 13–
22. 
8 Dominique Barthélemy, ‘The Chivalric Transformation and the Origins of Tournament as Seen Through 
Norman Chroniclers’, Haskins Society Journal 20 (2009): 141–60 (145–9). But cf. the suggestion that 




surprisingly neglected, especially by historians.9 Historical scholarship abounds on twelfth-
century Anglo-Norman historians who wrote about the Norman Conquest, including William 
of Malmesbury, Henry of Huntingdon and Orderic Vitalis, and on the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle, their main English source – but not on Poitiers.10 There is a lack of dialogue 
between literary and historical scholarship concerning the Gesta: this problem has both 
reinforced the vilification of Poitiers and perpetuated the tendency to regard him with 
scepticism simply because of his remarkable ability to turn a phrase. 
Any accord which Poitiers finds or makes between the classical past and the Norman 
Conquest is usually attributed to conventional medieval classicism rather than authorial 
ingenuity. The notable exception is Beer’s study on Poitiers’ classical rhetorical style and 
claims to truth.11 But the study is largely confined to the text itself: she does not consider 
Poitiers’ intended audience, nor the import of his first-hand knowledge of the historical 
events.12 On the other hand, historical critiques of Poitiers have tended to obscure the 
intimate connection between his conquest narrative and the moral content of the classical 
stories on which he draws. There is a wealth of scholarship on uses of the classical past in the 
Middle Ages,13 but in Poitiers’ case this is often limited to identifying borrowings of specific 
quotations. Where, then, are the motives and the man behind the classicist? 
                                                 
9 On the dearth of studies about Poitiers’ work, see David Bates, The Normans and Empire: the Ford Lectures 
Delivered in the University of Oxford During Hilary Term 2010 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 68. 
10 e.g. recently, Sigbjørn Olsen Sønnesyn, William of Malmesbury and the Ethics of History (Woodbridge: 
Boydell Press, 2012); Catherine A. M. Clarke, ‘Writing Civil War in Henry of Huntingdon’s Historia 
Anglorum’, Anglo-Norman Studies 31 (2009): 31–48; Amanda Jane Hingst, The Written Word: Past and Place 
in the Work of Orderic Vitalis (Notre Dame: University of Indiana Press, 2009); Nicholas Brooks, ‘Why is the 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle About Kings?’ Anglo-Saxon England 39 (2010): 43–70. 
11 Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth, 13–22. 
12 e.g. Beer finds the Gesta ‘curiously scientific’ in its information about siege, numbers of combatants, 
William’s behaviour, and the element of chance (Narrative Conventions of Truth, 22); whereas Poitiers’ military 
and clerical background, and his personal knowledge of William, go far in explaining his narrative choices: on 
the value of this historical context, see Pierre Bouet, ‘Orderic Vital, lecteur critique de Guillaume de Poitiers’, in 
Mediaevalia Christiana XIe–XIIIe siècles: hommage à Raymonde Foreville de ses amis, ses collègues et ses 
anciens élèves, ed. Coloman Etienne Viola (Paris: Éditions universitaires, 1989), 25–50 (25). 
13 See famously Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1927); Beryl Smalley, Historians in the Middle Ages (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974); 
Ernst Breisach, ed., Classical Rhetoric and Medieval Historiography (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
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Poitiers does not merely use classical quotations and stories: he thinks about the past 
with them. Poitiers asserts, for instance, that William conquered England with more than 
1,000 ships, thereby evoking and exceeding the 1,000 named in the Aeneid.14 Poitiers’ 
eloquently worded estimate may also be relatively accurate: Poitiers’ contemporary, Norman 
historian, William of Jumièges, probably exaggerated his claim of 3,000 ships.15 Poitiers, 
after all, spent time in William’s retinue, and would be in a position to know.16 The Gesta’s 
rhetoric has frustrated many twentieth-century historians, but it is unhelpful to view the Gesta 
as a work of deceit. Rather, we may say that Poitiers had an accurate understanding of the 
expectations of his audience, for the Gesta displays both political acuity and an awareness of 
Christian morality. 
My present aim is not to conduct a comprehensive literary study of his classicism, 
already surveyed by Beer, and many instances of which have been noted by Davis and 
Chibnall. Poitiers was precise in invoking the particular moral in a classical story relevant to 
his persuasive narrative about William’s legitimacy, and in applying it at the right moment. It 
is this precision which now merits attention. Poitiers did not use classical allusion 
superficially, nor does his Gesta belong in the realm of empty flattery. Latin panegyric as a 
genre was never static or proscriptive; scholarly scorn of panegyric, and the misconception 
                                                 
Publications, Western Michigan University, 1985); Matthew Kempshall, Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 
400–1500 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011). 
14 GG, 110–11 (ii.7). Cf. Virgil, Aeneid, in Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid: Books 1–6, ed. H. Rushton Fairclough 
and G. P. Goold. 2 vols. Revised edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1916), 1: 330–1 (ii, line 
198). 
15 William of Jumièges, The Gesta Normannorum ducum of William of Jumièges, Orderic Vitalis, and Robert of 
Torigni, ed. and trans. E. M. C. van Houts. 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992–5), 2: 164–5 (vii.14); 
on the unlikeliness of this estimate, see, GG, 111, nn. 4–5; Bernard S. Bachrach, ‘The Norman Conquest, 
Countess Adela, and Abbot Baudri’, Anglo-Norman Studies 35 (2013): 65–78 (73–5). William’s Ship List, 
likely a near-contemporary source, suggests – like Poitiers – totals of or approaching 1000 ships: see Elisabeth 
M. C. van Houts, ‘The Ship List of William the Conqueror’, Anglo-Norman Studies 10 (1987): 159–83, 
especially 166, 169–70, 174. 
16 Cf. Gilduin Davy, Le duc et la loi: héritages, images et expressions du pouvoir normatif dans le duché de 
Normandie, des origines à mort du Conquérant: fin du IXe siècle–1087 (Paris: De Boccard, 2004), 180, for 
claims about Poitiers’s reliability as a contemporary source; Gillingham, ‘William the Bastard at War’, 142; but 




that it was sycophantic or reductive, are primarily twentieth-century ideas.17 Rather, 
individual panegyrists adapted the genre to suit the subject and the situation at hand.18 In 
asserting William’s legitimacy, Poitiers employed the classical material he knew intimately to 
appeal directly to the moral and legal conundrums of his day. In doing so, he sought to 
compete on the same terms as classically-inspired writing in eleventh-century England, but 
with a different agenda.19 He re-envisioned classical stories through a medieval lens, using 
them to buttress his moral judgements of Harold Godwineson and William. His sophistication 
in this regard suggests that there remains a need to re-examine the vision of the classical past 
in the Anglo-Norman world. The Gesta firmly reinforces the idea that classicising history 
could be an endeavour more substantive than stylistic for medieval writers of history. 
 
The audience of the Gesta Guillelmi 
The Gesta was not an academic discussion of succession practices, theoretical or otherwise.20 
It addressed a problem more immediate and practical: the fears of William’s subjects, allies 
and critics. William was newly king, and kings were responsible for their subjects’ security, 
both physical and spiritual. The conquest persisted in recent memory:21 those who felt its 
effects, whether through trauma or opportunities, needed a guarantee that he would defend 
                                                 
17 Roger Rees, ‘The Modern History of Latin Panegyric’, in Latin Panegyric, ed. Roger Rees (Oxford: Oxford 
Univeristy Press, 2012), 3–48 (15–16). 
18 Susanna Morton Braund, ‘Praise and Protreptic in Early Imperial Panegyric: Cicero, Seneca, Pliny’, in Latin 
Panegyric, ed. Rees, 85–108 (87). 
19 See especially Elizabeth M. Tyler, ‘The Vita Ædwardi: the Politics of Poetry at Wilton Abbey’, Anglo-
Norman Studies 31 (2009): 135–56; Simon Keynes and Rosalind Love, ‘Earl Godwine’s Ship’, Anglo-Saxon 
England 38 (2009): 185–223 (205–6, 212–13, 216–18, 223). 
20 Harold claimed that his accession in 1066 was Edward the Confessor’s deathbed bequest; William justified 
his claim based on a bequest from Edward in 1051 and Harold’s alleged perjury of an oath of fealty to William. 
The validity of these competing claims was a matter of contention on both sides of the Channel: see, most 
comprehensively, Stephen Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’, in Edward the 
Confessor: the Man and the Legend, ed. Richard Mortimer (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009), 77–118; see 
also Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth, 20–1; Garnett, Conquered England, 5, 232. 
21 See Elisabeth van Houts, Memory and Gender in Medieval Europe, 900–1200 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1999), especially 123–36. 
6 
 
their interests. Safety and salvation were in jeopardy, and these twin threats prompted Poitiers 
to create a moral argument for William’s leadership. 
Poitiers roots his narrative firmly in the distant past, one brought to terms with the 
moral demands of the present. He makes explicit and tacit moral connections between ancient 
heroes and contemporary leaders to justify William’s claim, to defend his leadership and to 
commend him to posterity.22 It is therefore essential to place greater emphasis on Poitiers’ 
conscious and substantive use of classical references than has been usual among historians.23 
Poitiers quotes and alludes to classical works and heroes throughout the Gesta,24 but 
the stories and qualities of three heroes – Aeneas, Caesar and Theseus – constitute the most 
substantial and sustained part of Poitiers’ narrative case for Harold’s illegitimacy and 
William’s legitimacy. For Poitiers, these heroes are more than categorical classical exempla 
for praising a ruler: they are directly and particularly relevant to the Norman Conquest of 
England. Poitiers finds significant parallels between the intention, destination and morality of 
these heroes’ sea voyages and William’s conquest. 
The significance of Poitiers’ rhetoric in its political and cultural context is best 
understood in view of his purpose in writing and his audience. The Gesta exists only in a 
transcript of an incomplete manuscript.25 Yet against the lack of extant manuscripts must be 
placed the evidence that both William of Malmesbury and Orderic Vitalis26 – and others, 
                                                 
22 GG, 150–3 (ii.30). 
23 e.g. Barlow, ‘Carmen de Hastingae proelio’, 44; David Bates, ‘1066: Does the Date Still Matter?’ Historical 
Research 78 (2005): 460–1; Bates, William the Conqueror, 34, 36, 49, 68; David C. Douglas, William the 
Conqueror: the Norman Impact upon England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 204; Antonia 
Gransden, Historical Writing in England. I: c.500–c.1307 (London: Routledge, 1974), 101–2. 
24 Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth, 3–22; for a partial list, see GG, 189–90. 
25 André Duchesne edited the now-lost manuscript in 1619; Orderic Vitalis provides most of the information 
known about Poitiers: Davis and Chibnall, ‘Introduction’, in GG, xv. 




including the author of the Liber Eliensis27 – had first-hand familiarity with the Gesta,28 
indicating circulation and a readership on both sides of the Channel. 
The Gesta was probably intended for a wide audience. It belonged to a larger project 
of Norman legitimation, akin to strategies of Norman historical writing after the conquest of 
Sicily used by Geoffroi Malaterra and William of Apulia. Each Norman apologist sought not 
only to advertise the strength of the Normans as a people, but also to compete for the primacy 
of his own leader’s heroism.29 The Normans were conquering, and their advocates were 
aware that Christendom as a whole continued to watch and to comment. 
Poitiers’ primary audience, which he would have reached through court circles, was 
the Norman elite on whom William depended. After imposing control in England, William 
shifted his strategic priorities to defending his expanded realm and sustaining his men’s 
allegiance.30 The 1070s – when Poitiers was writing – and early 1080s saw the outbreak of 
Norman power conflicts and defections. William’s half-brother Odo of Bayeux, earl of Kent, 
was tried for defrauding the crown and the Church, and William faced a Norman rebellion 
organised by his son, Robert Curthose.31 Maintaining the support of Norman nobles after 
1066 was essential, especially given the ambition and opportunism of men like Odo and 
Robert. 
                                                 
27 E.O. Blake, ed., Liber Eliensis. Camden, third series, 92 (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 
1962), 158–9, 185–95. 
28 Rodney Thomson, William of Malmesbury. Revised edn. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), 69, 214; 
William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum Anglorum, eds. and trans. R.A.B. Mynors, R.M. Thomson and M. 
Winterbottom. 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998–1999), 1: 416–63 (ii.228–iii.247); Orderic 
Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, 2: 258–61 (iv.ii.217–18). 
29 See Marie-Agnès Lucas-Avenel, ‘Le récit de Geoffroi Malaterra ou la légitimation de Roger, grand comte de 
Sicile’, Anglo-Norman Studies 34 (2012): 169–92; Bates, Normans and Empire, 67–9. 
30 M. Swanton, ed. and trans., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles. Revised edn. (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 195–
208 (D 1066–1072[1071]); cf. Bates, Normans and Empire, 64–92, and, for an earlier interpretation, Douglas, 
William the Conqueror, 204–7, 211–21. See also Marjorie Chibnall, The Debate on the Norman Conquest 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 2. 
31 Swanton, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 213–15 (DE 1079–1083). For the suggestion that Odo commissioned 
the Gesta Guillelmi, see Davy, Le duc et la loi, 16; Leah Shopkow, History and Community: Norman Historical 




Poitiers aimed to preserve the favour of William’s allies. He styled his narrative in a 
classical, heroic genre aimed at a well-educated court audience, including politically 
influential nobles and clerics familiar with the classical rhetoric Poitiers employs.32 Poitiers, 
once William’s chaplain, had battlefield and court experience as a classically-educated knight 
and cleric. The Gesta’s panegyric style would be unlikely to persuade those already opposed 
to Norman power: many in England and Europe condemned William’s violence, fearing the 
expansion of a Norman empire.33 Yet William’s allies and mercenaries included other 
peoples of Europe, among them the Flemish linked to him by marriage; it was politically 
shrewd to continue communicating William’s impressiveness and legitimacy to these 
peoples.34 Even in Normandy, where primogeniture was more customary than in England, 
William’s conquest of a land to which he had no direct hereditary claim required some 
justification.35 The Gesta was designed not just to convince, but to remind. 
Nor should an English audience be discounted. The Gesta was known in both England 
and Normandy; the narrative reveals Poitiers’ knowledge of English geography and engages 
with questions about the succession in 1066 similar to those raised in MS ‘D’ of the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle.36 Poitiers’ arguments suggest familiarity with English succession practices 
and an interest in targeting his case accordingly. He recognises the nobles’ role in electing a 
king and, although he acknowledges the nobles’ desire to elect a fellow countryman, he 
                                                 
32 On Poitiers writing for a ‘courtly audience’, see Roger D. Ray, ‘Orderic Vitalis and William of Poitiers: a 
Monastic Reinterpretation of William the Conqueror’, Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire 50 (1972): 1116–
27 (1123–5); most recently, on chivalrous themes in the Gesta Guillelmi, see Barthélemy, ‘Chivalric 
Transformation’, 145–9. 
33 See Elisabeth van Houts, ‘The Norman Conquest Through European Eyes’, English Historical Review 110 
(1995): 843–53; David Bates, ‘William the Conqueror and His Wider Western World’, Haskins Society Journal 
(2006): 73–87. 
34 On William’s imperial pretensions, qualities and effectiveness, see Bates, Normans and Empire, 64–92. 
35 See, e.g., Ann Williams, ‘Some Notes and Considerations on Problems Connected with the English Royal 
Succession, 860–1066’, Anglo-Norman Studies 1 (1979): 144–67; Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, 2: 
xxxvii, 364; Marjorie Chibnall, ‘Les droits d’héritage selon Orderic Vital’, Revue Historique de Droit Français 
et Étranger, 4th series, 48 (1970): 347. 




appeals on two occasions to Edgar the Ætheling’s youth as a strike against his eligibility for 
kingship – a reason which might have resonated more with an English audience than a 
Norman one,37 as similar comments in the Norman Carmen de Hastingae proelio indicate.38 
Even Poitiers would probably not have expected recent victims of conquest to have accepted 
this kind of philosophical argument about kingship, especially as Edgar was still very much 
alive and continuing to press his claim in alliance with the Scottish king Malcolm.39 But 
throughout the Gesta, Poitiers looks to the future. He eagerly anticipated that the tie between 
the two lands would grow stronger. He may have envisioned an audience not English and 
Norman, but Anglo-Norman, which he believed would develop under William’s continued 
leadership.40 
Lastly, Poitiers wrote to communicate William’s deeds to posterity. Poitiers’ 
knowledge of the classics, including Virgil’s Aeneid, Caesar’s De bello gallico and Sallust’s 
Catilina,41 demonstrated to him that writing could survive the ages, influencing, guiding and 
instructing them. Poitiers aims to teach William’s deeds ‘to the age to come’,42 observes that 
William’s victory against conspiracy ‘[deserves] to be remembered by future generations’,43 
claims to ‘think it worthwhile to hand down to posterity the exact truth’ of William’s just 
conquests of Maine and England, and presents William as one ‘whose memory we wish to 
                                                 
37 GG, 146–7 (ii.28), 162–3 (ii.35). 
38 Guy of Amiens, The Carmen de Hastingae proelio of Guy, Bishop of Amiens, ed. and trans. Frank Barlow 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 38–9 (ll. 643–54), 44–5 (ll. 741–52). 
39 For years, post-Conquest commentators struggled to reconcile William’s conquest with the claim of this more 
legitimate heir: Emily A. Winkler, ‘1074 in the Twelfth Century’, Anglo-Norman Studies 36 (2014): 241–58; cf. 
Nicholas Hooper, ‘Edgar the Ætheling: Anglo-Saxon Prince, Rebel, Crusader’, Anglo-Saxon England 14 (1985): 
197–214. 
40 For the argument that the Bayeux Tapestry was aimed at a cross-Channel audience, see: T.A. Heslop, 
‘Regarding the Spectators of the Bayeux Tapestry: Bishop Odo and His Circle’, Art History 33 (2009): 222–49, 
especially 229–32. 
41 Poitiers favours classical allusions over references to patristic texts. On this tendency and the influence of 
Sallust, see Janet Martin, ‘Classicism and Style in Latin Literature’, in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth 
Century, eds. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 537–68 (548–9); 
Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, 2: 258–9 (iv.ii.217); Davis and Chibnall, ‘Introduction’, in GG, xviii. 
42 ‘Guillelmus vero, gloriosissimus dux, cuius acta venturam aetatem divina opitulatione freti docebimus …’: 
GG, 6–7 (i.4). 
43 ‘notificanda saeculis unius diei pugna’: GG, 10–11 (i.8). 
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preserve in writing.’44 These comments, although grandiose, nevertheless convey a sincere 
address to posterity. Classical historians were aware that they could address a future audience 
through writing as they could not verbally; Thucydides, for example, wrote his contemporary 
history for a future readership, as a ‘possession for all time’ and for ‘all those who want to 
know’.45 Poitiers emulated classical rhetoric to shape future readers’ perceptions about the 
Norman Conquest.46 In Poitiers’s account of the present, the future was his vision; the past, 
his means. 
 
Classical heroes and the Gesta Guillelmi 
Poitiers’ preoccupation with heroes engaged in sea voyages and conquest – precedents he 
uses to support directly his arguments about the Norman Conquest – merits explanation in the 
wider context of his classical comparisons. Several scholars have made lists of Poitiers’ 
classical allusions, indiscriminately mixing comparisons of equivalence, competition and 
superiority.47 The resulting impression is that these allusions are of a piece: Tabuteau claims, 
for instance, that in the Gesta ‘the Conqueror comes out better in comparison with every 
famous ancient figure.’48 This is simply incorrect. Poitiers treats the heroes differently, 
depending on which classicising arguments will best support his conquest narrative at key 
moments. On different occasions, Poitiers asserts only William’s superiority, only his 
equivalence or both, and with varying degrees of emphasis. Merely listing Poitiers’ classical 
allusions, although a useful endeavour, obscures their narrative effect. Poitiers uses them 
                                                 
44 ‘Quapropter nos operae pretium arbitramur quam verissime tradere … quem scripto propagamus … optamus’: 
GG, 58–9 (i. 36). 
45 Quoted in John Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 21. 
46 Cf. classicism used to similar effect in the Bayeux Tapestry and to widen the appeal of the Norman Conquest 
story: Heslop, ‘Regarding the Spectators of the Bayeux Tapestry.’ 
47 Cf. GG, 189–90; Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth, 13–22; Emily Zack Tabuteau, ‘Review Article: The 
Gesta Guillelmi of William of Poitiers, eds. and trans. R.H.C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall’, Speculum 75 
(2000): 523–5. 
48 Tabuteau, ‘Review Article: The Gesta Guillelmi’, 523. 
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when pertinent, and when his account is in need of defence and support. Hence, he uses 
comparisons with seafaring conquerors most often, and to greatest effect. The degree of each 
comparison matters, as does its timing. 
Crucially, Poitiers only compares William to classical heroes after Harold seizes the 
throne and William decides to contest the claim. Comparisons to classical heroes were 
unnecessary when William was a duke, a stage of his career which needed neither proof nor 
the foundation of tradition. His accession to the dukedom, a title he inherited from his father, 
was legal and consistent with the Norman practice of primogeniture. The Conquest of 
England, however, was a different matter: because it involved contest, Poitiers’s promotion 
of William required classical ammunition. 
Indeed, the very first comparison between William and any classical hero occurs on 
William’s sea voyage to England, the beginning of the conquest venture. Poitiers compares 
William to two predecessors in sea ventures, Agamemnon and Xerxes, and asserts William’s 
explicit superiority in this regard, not his equality. It is significant that these assertions occur 
in Poitiers’ own voice – ‘we protest’ that William had more ships than Agamemnon; ‘we 
proclaim’ William linked Normandy and England, whereas Xerxes linked two towns with a 
boat bridge49 – for he avoids such direct comparisons between Harold and any hero. Poitiers 
proclaims William’s explicit superiority when comparing conquests by sea of any sort. 
Agamemnon barely succeeded in his endeavour and the Roman Empire took years to expand, 
whereas William conquered England in a day.50 Where William needed unequivocal 
superiority was in the justification for crossing the Channel and conquering a foreign land – 
indeed, for the very idea of conquest. Poitiers returns repeatedly to analogies with seafaring 
                                                 
49 ‘protestamur’; ‘propagamus’: GG, 110–13 (ii.7). 
50 GG, 142–3 (ii.26). 
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heroes who conquer, because these stories and precedents do the most moral work for 
advancing his argument. 
Aeneas, Caesar and Theseus are special because they permeate the narrative in this 
regard: the former two in the pervasiveness of allusions; the latter in moral depth. Poitiers 
uses the time-tested and honourable heroes Aeneas and Caesar frequently, but also 
selectively, so as to distinguish the Norman Conquest as a special, unblemished enterprise. 
Theseus’ sea journey provides a useful moral example of the consequences of oath-breaking, 
and so proves particularly useful for Poitiers’ aim to compare the integrity of William and 
Harold. The comparisons were potentially problematic, for the close parallels between the 
heroes’ deeds and William’s endeavours might suggest similar implications which Poitiers 
hoped to avoid. There could be no defeated Troy, lost Britain or broken promise in the story 
of William’s life, because Poitiers sought to dispel any doubts about the king’s legitimacy. 
The core of Poitiers’ argument is not just his hailing William’s strength, victories or 
achievements, but his justifying William’s conquest through particular narrative emphasis on 
words and promises. 
In describing William’s military abilities, Poitiers does not need to argue that William 
is superior in all respects. Poitiers uses several individual mentions of heroes, each to make a 
single point about William’s personal military strength – his defence of his men and his 
realm, his ability to fight and win against the odds, and his daring. In these cases, Poitiers 
asserts equivalence and superiority, but stresses the former. Although William is Xerxes’ 
superior in sea crossings, they are equal in strength.51 Poitiers emphasises first that Marius 
and Pompey deserve their victories because of their excellent leadership. He then mentions 
their reserve in leading small raiding parties as compared to William, but these heroes are 
                                                 
51 GG, 112–13 (ii.7). 
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equals in the grand enterprises.52 William is Tydeus’ ‘equal and in no way inferior in 
standing’:53 their circumstances were different, as Tydeus faced only 50 men as opposed to 
thousands; the key point is their shared ability to defeat the odds. These references establish 
William’s leadership abilities, but are not part of the more important moral goal of the 
narrative: to sustain an argument for William’s legitimacy. 
 Poitiers declares William the equal of Achilles and Aeneas in daring: ‘Against 
Harold, who was such a man as poems liken to Hector or Turnus, William would have dared 
to fight in single combat no less than Achilles against Hector, or Aeneas against Turnus.’54 
He claims that Statius and Virgil would rank William greater, which implies superiority, but 
Poitiers does not choose to make the point himself. Poitiers’ implication of the superior truth 
claim of his prose, as compared to poetry, is noteworthy. He is responding directly to the 
poem Carmen de Hastingae proelio, composed shortly after the Battle of Hastings. Whereas 
the Carmen calls William a son of Hector, Poitiers carefully removes the connection between 
William and a defeated hero.55 In Poitiers’ efforts to establish William’s military prowess, the 
comparison of bravery in single combat – unlike the argument for the Conquest’s legitimacy 
– does not require William to be better than his predecessors: rather, like them, he must 
simply be the victor. Indeed, Poitiers also stays away from making a direct comparison 
between Harold and his predecessors as losers of single combat – Hector and Turnus – 
because he does not find Harold worthy of these heroes’ impressive legacy. Hector and 
Turnus fought honourably, courageously entered into single combat, and avoided cowardice. 
In Poitiers’ view, Harold shared none of these personal qualities: for this reason Poitiers 
avoids making an explicit comparison to Harold in his own authorial voice. 
                                                 
52 GG, 114–17 (ii.9). 
53 ‘par, haud inferior loco’: GG, 136–7 (ii.22). 
54 ‘Cum Heraldo, tali qualem poemata dicunt Hectorem vel Turnum, non minus auderet Guillelmus congredi 
singulari certamine, quam Achilles cum Hectore, vel Aeneas cum Turno.’ GG, 134–7 (ii.22). 
55 Guy of Amiens, Carmen, 36–7; for dating, see xv–xxx; see also: R.H.C. Davis and others, ‘The Carmen de 
Hastingae proelio: a Discussion’, Anglo-Norman Studies 2 (1980): 1–20 (6–10). 
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It is only in the matter of William’s Christian faith to a single God that Poitiers asserts 
William’s superiority to Achilles and Aeneas. Protesting his own humility, Poitiers claims his 
goal is to ‘bring humbly to the notice of kings his piety in the worship of the true God, who 
alone is God from eternity to the end of the world and beyond’.56 The implication is that, 
however honourable, pious and heroic these ancient exemplars were, they were necessarily 
inferior because their virtues were directed towards numerous, unpredictable and erratic gods. 
One of Poitiers’ main moral defences for William is divine support: this is why, in this 
particular category of comparison, William must be superior. 
In one key case, Poitiers asserts only equivalence: no sense of superiority is 
mentioned or even implied. This most striking instance of equivalence is also the most 
revealing about the ideal of Christian rulership Poitiers seeks to convey. On describing the 
news of William’s kingship reaching Normandy, Poitiers makes a single comparison of 
equivalence between William and Augustus to make the point that William’s peacekeeping is 
extremely valuable for Normandy: ‘It was doubtful which was the greater, his country’s love 
for him or his love for his country, just as it was once doubted of Caesar Augustus and the 
Roman people.’57 William’s matching Augustus – as opposed to surpassing him – shows that 
William has achieved something. William is a king, at home in his patria, exhibiting the ideal 
quality of rulership which he shares with Augustus: mutual love between ruler and people. 
Poitiers does not need to – nor can he – make William improve on this feat. William, as 
Augustus’ likeness, is the answer to his subjects’ fears for their own security. 
Poitiers measures William against Caesar, Aeneas and Theseus according to the 
medieval criteria of ideal Christian kingship and judges him more worthy of rule: William is 
victorious where others are overcome, and vigilant in situations where others are negligent. A 
                                                 
56 ‘titulatura ipsius humillime regnantibus pietatem in cultu veri Dei, qui solus ab aeterno in finem seculorum et 
ultra Deus est’: GG, 136–7 (ii.22). 
57 ‘Profecto dubium erat illum patria, an patriam ille, plus diligeret, qualiter est olim dubitatum de Caesare 
Augusto et populo Romano.’ GG, 154–5 (ii.32). 
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medieval ruler was expected to be an exemplary military leader and a servant of God and 
people, always anticipating and addressing crisis.58 For Poitiers, the ruler who forgets or 
neglects, with or without intent, is unworthy of the title and a danger to the security of his 
realm.59 
 
William and Caesar: the problems of the past 
Poitiers’ comparison of William with Caesar is the most well-documented classical allusion 
in the Gesta, but the nature of the contrast between the two heroes bears further explanation. 
It is traditional to argue that medieval historians sought authority and legitimacy for their 
subject by turning to classical models,60 and to observe that medieval writers of panegyric 
biography imitate the examples of Suetonius and Sallust in constructing medieval kings like 
ancient emperors and heroes. R. Allen Brown and Elisabeth van Houts have referred 
primarily to Poitiers’ comparison of William with Caesar,61 but not to the contrast. Others 
have noted the contrast: T. A. Dorey has remarked that Poitiers casts William as a ‘second 
and greater Caesar’,62 and Roger D. Ray has noted that Poitiers is in this regard using the 
                                                 
58 Janet Nelson, ‘Kingship and Empire’, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350–
c.1450, ed. J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 211–251 (218); for the early 
development of this ideal, see John Procopé, ‘Greek and Roman Political Theory’, in Cambridge History of 
Medieval Political Thought, ed. Burns, 21–36 (25–8). 
59 On the development of negligentia as a particularly problematic royal vice in ninth-century political thought, 
see, most comprehensively, Hans Hubert Anton, Fürstenspiegel und Herrscherethos in der Karlolingerzeit 
(Bonn: L. Röhrscheid, 1968). 
60 On the uses and re-uses of classical rhetoric in the Middle Ages, see Ruth Morse, Truth and Convention in the 
Middle Ages: Rhetoric, Representation and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
61 R. Allen Brown, ‘Guillaume le Conquérant et son temps’, in idem, Castles, Conquest and Charters 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1989), 305–15 (315); Elisabeth M. C. van Houts, ‘Latin Poetry and the Anglo-
Norman Court 1066–1135: the Carmen de Hastingae proelio’, Journal of Medieval History 15 (1989): 39–62 
(41–2); Elisabeth van Houts, ‘Historical Writing’, in A Companion to the Anglo-Norman World, eds. 
Christopher Harper-Bill and Elisabeth van Houts (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), 103–21 (106), citing and 
summarising R.H.C. Davis, ‘Poitiers and his History of William the Conqueror’, in Writing of History in the 
Middle Ages, eds. Davis and Wallace-Hadrill, 71–100. 
62 T.A. Dorey, ‘William of Poitiers: Gesta Guillelmi ducis’, in Latin Biography, ed. T.A. Dorey (London: 
Routledge, 1967), 139–55 (153). 
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traditional medieval ‘outdoing topos’.63 The problem with assessing Poitiers’ allusive choices 
purely in terms of comparison and contrast is that doing so highlights only the traditional 
elements of Poitiers’ classical allusions, without identifying Poitiers’ particular nuance and its 
reason. These assessments have been seen as evidence for the superficiality of the Gesta, a 
view which belies and obscures Poitiers’ deep engagement with the problems and moral 
contingencies of the past. 
Ray’s and Dorey’s conclusions are convincing to an extent. In classical 
historiography, which medieval writers emulated, authors established their own authority by 
criticising predecessors and contemporaries,64 which medieval writers emulated. Poitiers 
links William with Caesar to place him in a historical tradition of great men, but also argues 
for progress, showing William as the greater leader. Caesar, as William’s predecessor in 
crossing the Channel to conquer, provided an ideal comparison for Poitiers. Caesar was a 
renowned historical figure and one of the Nine Worthies, but he failed in the conquest of 
Britain.65 
Poitiers’ William is not only greater than Caesar, but in important ways different from 
him. A key distinction is between constancy and volatility, both in character and in the 
assurance of success.66 The twelfth-century poet Chrétien de Troyes praises his patron, Philip 
of Flanders, by claiming that Philip was far superior to Alexander the Great. The ‘proof’ of 
this superiority, Chrétien confidently asserts, is in the constancy of Philip’s Christian 
character, most evident in the virtue of charity. Alexander, although impressive, was 
inconsistent; because of Alexander’s pride, his actions rendered him culpable as often as 
                                                 
63 Ray, ‘Orderic Vitalis and William of Poitiers’, 1120–1, arguing for Poitiers’s use of the ‘outdoing’ topos as 
defined by Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), especially 162–5. 
64 Marincola, Authority and Tradition, 5, 218–19. 
65 Caesar’s missions lasted from 55–54 BC; the Claudian invasion of AD 43 began the Roman occupation of 
Britain that ended by AD 410. 
66 On the contrast Poitiers draws between William’s prudence and Caesar’s rashness, see Beer, Narrative 
Conventions of Truth, 14. 
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honourable.67 The nature of this critique is not arbitrary: pride was, in the view of Gregory 
the Great, the most serious vice which could afflict a medieval ruler.68 Similarly, Poitiers 
conveys the differences in a way which suits his own vision for the nature of William’s 
worthiness of rule. Two previously unremarked differences important to the Norman 
Conquest story are in the nature of the two conquerors’ authority over Britain specifically, 
and – more subtly – in William’s use of the spoken word. 
Poitiers follows the medieval tradition of echoing and invoking the ancients by 
criticising Caesar whilst stating that he is doing otherwise. In a moment of significant 
understatement, he writes: ‘We omit further mention of Julius Caesar, as it may perhaps be 
considered disparaging.’69 Yet Poitiers has just narrated extensively Caesar’s failures in 
Britain and his inadequacy compared to William:70 
Julius Caesar, who twice crossed over to this same Britain (for the older name of England 
is Britain) with a thousand ships, did not perform deeds as great as this the first time, nor 
did he dare to advance far from the coast or to stay long on the coast, although he fortified 
a camp in the Roman fashion. He crossed over at the end of summer and returned before 
the following equinox. His legions were overcome with great fear when his ships were 
partly broken up by the tides and waves of the sea … What then did he accomplish that 
deserves the praise to be given to the man of whom we are writing?71 
                                                 
67 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval: the Story of the Grail, ed. Burton Raffel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999), 1–3 (ll. 11–60). 
68 Gregory illustrates this point with the careers of biblical kings Saul, David and Solomon in his Regula 
Pastoralis: for discussion and references, see Matthew Kempshall, ‘No Bishop, No King: the Ministerial 
Ideology of Kingship and Asser’s Res gestae Ælfredi’, in Belief and Culture in the Early Middle Ages: Studies 
Presented to Henry Mayr-Harting, eds. Richard Gameson and Henrietta Leyser (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 106–28 (117–19). 
69 ‘Mentionem super Iulio Caesare, quae forte notetur quasi derogans, omittamus.’ GG, 174–5 (ii.40). 
70 GG, 168–75 (ii.39–40); see also Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth, 14, 17–18. 
71 ‘Iulius Caesar bis transvectus in ipsam Britanniam navibus mille (nam Angliae nomen antiquius est 
Britanniae) non aeque magna peregit prima vice, nec a littore longius progredi, nec in littore, tametsi patria 
consuetudine castra munierit, diutius morari ausus est. Transiit in extremo aestasis, rediit ante aequinoctium 
quod prope instabat. Perturbatae sunt legiones eius magno metu, cum naves partim fractae aestu maritimo aut 




This passage highlights the men’s fear, and implies that Caesar is not a strong enough leader 
to make adequate provision for them. William, on the other hand, is for Poitiers a vigilant 
leader more capable of navigating the difficulties of a sea invasion. Pursuing his criticism of 
Caesar, Poitiers writes: 
The Britons often gave battle to Caesar; whereas William crushed the English so 
thoroughly in one day that afterwards they could not muster the courage to fight 
him again … Caesar sent out his cavalry to lay waste the fields with fire and 
plunder … William, on the other hand, made peace-offerings to the people, and so 
preserved with its inhabitants the land which he could have devastated utterly in a 
short time.72 
Although the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle makes a decidedly contrary assertion,73 Poitiers’ 
William is not destructive. For Poitiers, Caesar is not only an inferior military leader, but also 
unworthy of rule because of his destruction of land and property. The passage shows William 
as an efficient commander who protects his future subjects – quite the opposite of a man who 
ravaged the countryside after Hastings, flouting the traditions of nomination and election. 
Poitiers highlights Caesar’s military achievements in bringing three continents under his 
dominion – Africa, Europe and Asia – thereby associating William with classical precedent: 
the model of an ancient ruler conquering lands. 
But the authority of the ‘second and greater Caesar’ model was of limited value to 
Poitiers: in the invasion of Britain – the most similar enterprise of the two leaders – William 
had to be distinctly different. Poitiers does not list Caesar’s ventures in Britain; were he to 
draw a sustained parallel between Caesar and William, he would have to address two facts. 
                                                 
72 ‘Caesarem praelio saepius adorti sunt Britanni; Anglos adeo Guillelmus die uno protrivit, ut post secum 
dimicandi fiduciam nullatenus reciperent ... Caesar, ut agros vastaret igne ac praeda, equitatum suum effudit 
...Guillelmus autem pacifica iubens incolis, terram quam citius euertere posset, incolas cum terra sibi 
conservavit.’ GG, 170–1 (ii.40). 
73 For the account of William’s violence in 1066 and his subsequent harrying of the north: Swanton, ed., Anglo-
Saxon Chronicles, 195–208 (D 1066–1072[1071]). 
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First, Caesar’s invasion failed. Second, subsequent Roman dominion in Britain ultimately 
ended. Caesar’s deeds and legacy did not provide a model conducive to projecting William’s 
line as eternal rulers of England. The difference is subtle but important. Poitiers needed to 
differentiate William from Caesar in order to support his claims that William’s descendants 
will rule. A direct analogy with the Roman occupation – an era foreshadowed by Caesar’s 
invasion – would inevitably result in implying an eventual end to Norman control of England. 
For Poitiers, an oral claim carried great weight, and he re-uses Caesar’s words to 
enhance William’s constancy in this regard. He places Caesar’s famed words of victory, as 
reported by Suetonius – ‘Veni, vidi, vici’ – in William’s mouth when William promptly 
defeats Alençon.74 Suetonius describes Caesar’s victory thus: ‘Amidst the pageantry of the 
Pontic triumph, a litter carried in front a banner with three words: “I came, I saw, I 
conquered”, the sign indicating not (like the rest) the deeds of war, but the speed of their 
execution.’75 His report conjures the pomp and circumstance of traditional Roman triumphal 
practices, suggesting that this catchy slogan, written on a banner, was used to advertise 
Caesar’s victory at home. Hardly a slavish copyist, Poitiers renders this written claim of 
conquest as an oral one. He makes the leader proclaim the words on the battlefield: ‘The 
town, most strongly protected by its site, fortifications, and armed defenders, fell into his 
hands with such swift success that he could boast in these words, “I came, I saw, I 
conquered.” ’76 
This is important because Poitiers’ case hinges on oaths: it depends upon William 
appearing as a man of his word – and Harold the contrary. This appropriation is no simple, 
                                                 
74 GG, 28–9 (i.19); this and other direct parallels between William and Caesar are disscussed in Dorey, ‘William 
of Poitiers’, 152–3. 
75 ‘Pontico triumpho inter pompae fercula trium verborum praetulit titulum VENI·VIDI·VICI non acta belli 
significantem sicut ceteris, sed celeriter confecti notam.’ Suetonius, Divus Iulius, in Lives of the Caesars, ed. K. 
R. Bradley and John Carew Rolfe. 2 vols. Revised edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), 1: 
82–5 (c. 37).  
76 ‘Oppidum enim natura, opere atque armatura munitissimum adeo currente proventu in eius manum venit ut 
gloriari his verbis liceret: “Veni, vidi, vici.”’ GG, 28–9 (i.19). 
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inevitable, classical borrowing: rather, Poitiers changes the circumstances of the famed words 
to give them more immediacy, and to advance the close connection he wishes to establish 
between reality and William’s words. Poitiers notes that Harold’s perjured oath was 
proclaimed, and he cites the import of the verbal testimony of those who witnessed it: 
And, as the most truthful and distinguished men who were there as witnesses have told, 
at the crucial point in the oath he clearly and of his own free will pronounced these 
words that as long as he lived he would be the vicar of Duke William in the court of his 
lord King Edward; that he would strive to the utmost with his counsel and his wealth to 
ensure that the English monarchy should be pledged to him after Edward’s death …77 
Subsequently, he reiterates that Harold took his oath ‘with both voice and hand’ to William.78 
Words spoken and enacted should, in Poitiers’s view, carry the force of action and truth. In 
borrowing from Suetonius, Poitiers imbues William with the verbal authority which sustains 
his argument for William’s legitimacy throughout the Gesta. 
Poitiers uses Caesar as a model and precedent for William and his deeds only insofar 
as Caesar’s example is a worthy one for his purposes. He makes the linked stories diverge to 
suggest that William will take a different, superior route to Caesar in Britain. William will 
retain England for his line far into the future, unlike his predecessor whose labours on the 
island ended in failure. 
 
William and Aeneas: the revision of Trojan origins 
Poitiers compares William with Aeneas, navigating carefully around Troy to avoid 
associating the Norman Conquest with the ravaging and defeat which befell this ancient city. 
                                                 
77 ‘Et sicut veracissimi multaque honestate praeclarissimi homines recitavere, qui tunc affuere testes, in serie 
summa sacramenti libens ipse haec distinxit: se in curia domini sui Edwardi regis quandiu superesset ducis 
Guillelmi vicarium fore; inisurum quanto consilio valeret aut opibus ut Anglica monarchia post Edwardi 
decessum in eius manu confirmaretur …’ GG, 70–1 (i.42). 
78 ‘et lingua et manu’: GG, 76–7 (i.46), quoted also below; see also 68–79 (i.41–6). 
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Medieval peoples throughout Europe claimed Trojan origins in order to provide a sense of 
collective solidarity, to imbue their lineage with authority and to assert a connection with the 
legacy of Rome.79 Poitiers’ approach to Aeneas and Troy is important because of the way he 
adopts and rejects elements of this pervasive tradition to set William apart. 
Poitiers belonged to an aggressive Norman historiographical project, which historians 
have identified as one seeking to equal the long-established reputations of peoples in one 
geographic region like the Franks and Saxons. The Normans could not claim the same 
longevity of rule as could the Frankish kingdom: William’s family history and that of most of 
his entourage could not be traced beyond several generations.80 As descendants of Viking 
settlers in northern Europe established for less than two centuries, the Normans’ historians 
sought to graft the Norman past onto one longer and loftier than that of their Viking 
ancestry,81 often by claiming affiliation with Troy. At the start of the eleventh century, Dudo 
claimed Trojan origins for the Normans to prove the Normans’ nobility, portraying Rollo as 
‘a Christian Aeneas’ because both heroes founded a new dynasty.82 Claiming Trojan origins 
and parallels with Aeneas enabled Norman historians like Dudo to place themselves 
alongside the other peoples of Europe. 
Poitiers pushed the aggressive project of Norman historical writing further. Writing 
within a framework of classicising history and biography, he set himself a colossal task: not 
                                                 
79 Lee Patterson observes that ‘virtually every European nation claimed descent from a common origin at Troy’, 
Negotiating the Past: the Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1987), 202–3; Susan Reynolds, ‘Medieval Origines gentium and the Community of the Realm’, History 
68 (1983), 375–90 (375). 
80 Linda Georgianna, ‘Periodization and Politics: the Case of the Missing Twelfth Century in English Literary 
History’, Modern Language Quarterly 64 (2003): 153–68 (161). 
81 Shopkow, History and Community, 14; R.H.C. Davis, The Normans and their Myth (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1976) 49–58; on the origins of this trend in the late tenth century with the Norman dukes’ 
commissioning of Dudo’s history of Normandy, Emily Albu, The Normans in their Histories: Propaganda, 
Myth and Subversion (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2001), 7; Eleanor Searle, Predatory Kinship and the 
Creation of Norman Power, 840–1066 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 62–7; R.W. Southern, 
‘Aspects of the European Tradition of Historical Writing 1. The Classical Tradition from Einhard to Geoffrey of 
Monmouth’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, 20 (1970): 173–96 (190). 
82 Southern, ‘Classical Tradition’, 191–2. Dudo has Rollo descend from the Trojan Antenor: see Cassandra 
Potts, ‘Atque unum ex diversis gentibus populum effecit: Historical Tradition and the Norman Identity’, Anglo-
Norman Studies 18 (1995): 139–52 (142). 
22 
 
just to equal established traditions, but to surpass them and to change them. His task was the 
more complicated because of William’s tenuous connections to the land, lineage and 
monarchy of England. Poitiers was not alone in attempting to strengthen these connections 
after the Conquest. In the early twelfth century, William of Malmesbury records the legend of 
Herleva’s dream wherein her womb connects Normandy and England.83 Poitiers had an 
immediate, pressing goal to elide dispute over the English succession and to preserve for 
William the support of his subjects and of posterity. Claiming equality with the other peoples 
of Europe and their traditions would not be enough: he had to make William special. 
The link between William and Aeneas mattered to Poitiers in the specific context of 
Norman historiography and the Norman Conquest. According to Virgil’s Aeneid, the Trojan 
refugee Aeneas flees the fallen city, and founds the Latin people and the Julian clan on the 
Apennine Peninsula. Poitiers identifies William as a hero like Aeneas, but casts William as a 
man both arising from and founding a great dynasty. Emphasising descent from Troy would 
not further Poitiers’ goal for two reasons. It was not a claim unique to the Normans among 
the peoples of Europe, and it would place a defeated people at the beginning of a story about 
an invincible ruler. 
 Poitiers alludes to Aeneas during William’s sea journey to England in order to convey 
William’s valour, worthy of ancient heroism. The allusion permits Poitiers to demonstrate 
William’s confidence in the rightness of his enterprise, his attentiveness to his men’s needs 
and his superiority to Aeneas in analogous situations. Poitiers recounts how, after William’s 
ships set sail at night, the duke’s ship pulls ahead, and the next morning they see none of the 
other ships: 
                                                 




At once the anchor was dropped and, so that fear and grief might not trouble his 
companions, the mettlesome duke partook of an abundant meal, accompanied by spiced 
wine, as if he were in his hall at home, asserting with remarkable cheerfulness that all the 
others would arrive before long, guided by God to whose safe-keeping he had entrusted 
them. Virgil, the prince of poets, would not have thought it unfitting to insert in his praise 
of the Trojan Aeneas (who was the ancestor and glory of ancient Rome) an account of the 
confidence and purpose of this banquet.84 
The ships then arrive: the potential for crisis has been averted. The passage most likely refers 
to the banquets Aeneas hosts for his men; Dorey notes that Poitiers identifies William’s 
presence of mind with that of Aeneas.85 Davis and Chibnall concluded that, because none of 
Aeneas’ banquets occurred at sea, Poitiers is trying to have his hero’s banquet on the journey 
match or exceed Aeneas’s example.86 Poitiers portrays William as improving upon Aeneas’ 
behaviour in quality and extent. His claim that Virgil would have praised William provides 
credence of a classical authority, and it permits Poitiers to imply neatly that he is as a worthy 
successor of Virgil, the poet of poets. Poitiers had a keen interest in the power of words both 
written and spoken; he knew his educated court audience could not be retained – nor the 
English persuaded – without the aid of a recognised authority who transcended both time and 
cross-Channel conflict. 
Poitiers links William with Aeneas as founders of new dynasties.87 To some extent 
these allusions represent the kind of rhetorical technique that R.W. Southern describes: 
                                                 
84 ‘Confestim anchora iacta, ne metus atque moeror comitem turbam confundaret, abundans prandium nec 
baccho pigmentato carens, animosissimus dux, acsi in coenaculo domestico, memorabili cum hilaritate accepit; 
cunctos actutum affore promittens, Deo, cuius eos tutelae credidit, adducente. Non indignum duceret Mantuanus 
poetarum princeps laudibus Æneae Troiani, qui priscae Romae ut parens gloria fuit, securitatem atque 
intentionem huius mensae inserere.’ GG, 112–13 (ii.7). 
85 Dorey, ‘William of Poitiers’, 152; cf. GG, 112, n. 2. Aeneas hosts a feast for his men after his shipwreck on 
the Libyan coast: Virgil, Aeneid, i, ll. 186–222; he hosts another after receiving heavenly signs that the day had 
arrived to found their new city, Aeneid, vii, ll. 141–7. 
86 Davis and Chibnall, ‘Introduction’, in GG, xxxii. 
87 Dorey, ‘William of Poitiers’, 153. 
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‘everything in their picture had to tell the same story.’88 The analysis needs to be taken a step 
further: Poitiers’ analogies are not superficial; rather, he is both attentive to the thematic 
significance of the comparisons he makes within the context of the Norman Conquest, and 
aware of these comparisons’ implications – an awareness sustained in his narrative. 
 Poitiers limits and qualifies the connection between William and Aeneas, using 
rhetoric to illustrate William’s particular propinquity to the divine. He compares William’s 
stormy transit of the Channel to Aeneas’ journey from Sicily.89 William sails over calm seas, 
suggesting divine approval, whereas Aeneas is storm-tossed, borne by forces beyond his 
control.90 Poitiers animates the sun to imply that it shines with divine support for William’s 
victory over England during the victory celebrations in Normandy: 
It was a time of winter, and of the austere Lenten penances. Nevertheless 
everywhere celebrations were held as if it were a time of high festival. The sun 
seemed to shine with the clear brightness of summer, far more strongly than usual 
at this season.91 
Sunlight was a traditional marker of legitimacy in medieval narratives of papal elections and 
royal inaugurations. William acts with God, neither at the whim of Fate nor of the gods who 
consider Aeneas’ prayers for favourable winds:92 William is master not only of his choices, 
but of his circumstances. 
 The location of William’s feast in the Channel is significant in the context of 
justifying the Norman Conquest. William does not simply ‘outdo’ Aeneas in lavish 
                                                 
88 Southern, ‘Classical Tradition’, 185; cf. Davis and Chibnall, ‘Introduction’, in GG, xxxi–xxxii. 
89 Christopher Baswell, Virgil in Medieval England: Figuring the Aeneid from the Twelfth Century to Chaucer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32, n. 68. 
90 Virgil, Aeneid i, ll. 82–185. 
91 ‘Dies erant hiberni, et qui poenitentiae quadragesimalis rigori vacant. Ceterum ubique agebantur tanquam 
summae festivi temporis feriae. Sol aestiva serenitate ludicus videbatur, gratia dierum solita longe maior.’ GG, 
174–5 (ii.41). This image evokes the language of divine favour in the election miracles of Pope Gregory I in 
590. 
92 Cf. Virgil, Aeneid v, especially ll. 65–6, 762–78. 
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generosity: Poitiers transforms the whole invasion into a celebration. This is especially 
noteworthy given the responses of historians in England, who reacted with horror or avoided 
direct mention of the event.93 From the Norman perspective, the invasion was not tinged with 
dishonour: William was defending part of his rightful realm from a treacherous nobleman.94 
The celebratory atmosphere and William’s generous attention to his men convey the Norman 
perception of William’s just cause in making this sea journey. The allusion to Virgil 
appropriates the poet’s approval, permitting Poitiers to portray William as a hero like Aeneas, 
but one with greater control of his situation and his destiny. 
 The single combat parallel provided a way for Poitiers to judge William’s honour and 
Harold’s cowardice against a recognised classical and contemporary standard, and to cast 
William as the superior victor to classical heroes. When faced initially with Harold’s 
treachery, William proposes single combat to settle the matter: 
In short, William was ready to accept a judgement determined by the laws of peoples.95 
He did not wish the English to die as enemies on account of his dispute; he wished to 
decide the case by risking his own head in single combat.96 
 
For this brave and good man preferred to renounce something that was just and agreeable 
rather than cause the death of many men, being confident that Harold’s head would fall 
since his courage was less and his cause unjust.97 
                                                 
93 Swanton, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 195–200 (D 1066); on the phenomenon of ‘conspicuous avoidance’ in 
William of Malmesbury’s Vita Wulfstani and the anonymous Vita Ædwardi Regis qui apud Westmonasterium 
requiescit, see Monika Otter, ‘1066: the Moment of Transition in Two Narratives of the Norman Conquest’, 
Speculum 74 (1999): 565–86, especially 567. 
94 Davis, ‘William of Poitiers and His History of William the Conqueror’, 74. 
95 Davis and Chibnall note that this phrase is meant to indicate English and Norman legal customs: GG, 123, n. 
2. 
96 ‘Denique iudicium, quod iura gentium definirent, accipere praesto fuit. Anglos inimicos mori ob litem suam 
noluit; singulari certamine proprio capite causam determinare uoluit.’ GG, 122–3 (ii.12). 
97 ‘Nam vir strenuus et bonus iustum aliquid ac laetum renuntiare, nec multos occumbere volebat; Heraldi caput, 
pro quo minor fortitudo, aequitas nulla staret, casurum confidens.’ GG, 122–3 (ii.13). 
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Poitiers’ reiterated observations about the proposed duel defend William’s actions to his 
audience. In Normandy and in post-Conquest England, single combat would have been a 
familiar alternative to the ordeal or judicium Dei: the judicial duel was a recognised custom 
in Normandy, if not always enacted.98 Even if a bluff or strategic ploy, the proposal of a duel 
was in itself a verbal claim to moral authority and God’s favour – and we have already seen 
the importance which Poitiers accords to the spoken word. Furthermore, as a military man 
under William, Poitiers would have had personal experience with this kind of leadership in 
action.99 Single combat and its rhetoric resonated with Poitiers’s personal experience, and he 
sought to justify the Conquest within the framework of expectations and values he shared 
with his audience. 
 Poitiers invokes the single combat challenge later in the narrative with references to 
Achilles, Hector, Aeneas and Turnus to highlight the worthiness of William’s action, even 
though Harold has refused.100 By connecting William’s honour with that of ancient heroes, 
Poitiers secures his message in a more ancient tradition than Norman custom. Poitiers 
conveys in William’s victory both daring and moral superiority, ignoring the classical 
victors’ anger and intemperance because these traits would not help his cause. 
                                                 
98 See Matthew Strickland, ‘Provoking or Avoiding Battle? Challenge, Duel and Single Combat in Warfare of 
the High Middle Ages’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 
1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. Matthew Strickland (Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1998), 317–43, especially 328–
35; Ralph J. Hexter, Equivocal Oaths and Ordeals in Medieval Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1975), 8–9; GG, 122, n. 1. Davis and Chibnall (GG) also suggest that ‘such an offer, if made, would have 
been unacceptable to an Englishman’, but it would certainly not have been unfamiliar. For the argument that GG 
is ‘the exposition of a legal case’, cf. Garnett, Conquered England, 40; on military and legal parallels, see also 
Stephen D. White, ‘Proposing the Ordeal and Avoiding It: Strategy and Power in Western French Litigation, 
1050–1110’, in Cultures of Power: Lordship, Status and Process in Twelfth-Century Europe, ed. Thomas N. 
Bisson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 89–123; F.M. Powicke, The Loss of Normandy, 
1189–1204: Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire. 2nd edn. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1961), 242. 
99 Orderic Vitalis, Historia Ecclesiastica, 2: 258–9 (iv.ii.217); Strickland, ‘Provoking or Avoiding Battle?’ 319–
20. 
100 GG, 134–7 (ii.22), quoted above. At GG, 135, n. 11 the editors observe that Poitiers may have known of the 
duel between Achilles and Hector in the Ilias Latina. For the duels, see Homer, Iliad, ed. A. T. Murray and 
William F. Wyatt. 2 vols. Revised edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), 2: 452–91 (xxii); 
Virgil, Aeneid, xii, ll. 707–952. 
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 Dorey concludes that this passage is evidence of the ‘latent identification’ between 
Aeneas and William in the Gesta, a point which is convincing but incomplete. He observes 
that both William and Aeneas shared the virtue of pietas, sought to settle their respective 
disputes in single combat and followed a just cause against a treaty-breaker. Breaking his 
oath to William was Poitiers’ central criticism of Harold, as is particularly evident in Poitiers’ 
attitude towards Theseus.101 What needs to be added is that Poitiers identifies William with 
Aeneas only when useful in the context of the Norman Conquest. Dorey cites William’s 
challenge of single combat to Harold as evidence of the comparison between William and 
Aeneas,102 but does not mention the further parallel in the same sentence between William 
and Achilles – the hero of the Greeks and enemy of the Trojans.103 At the key moment, 
William is on the winning side: unconditional victory proves his just cause.104 William’s 
authority in England depended upon an association with the victor of single combat, be he 
Greek or Trojan, rather than with Aeneas specifically. 
William and his dynasty emerge as superior to the victorious ancient heroes. Achilles 
was killed in battle, and Aeneas fled a defeated city – situations Poitiers does not 
acknowledge. An allusion to Agamemnon creates the desired contrast between William and 
the Trojan tradition, because both men were victors in conquest, but Agamemnon needed 10 
years and significant aid to conquer Troy.105 Either he was a weaker commander than 
William, as Poitiers suggests, or – more problematically – the Trojans were more than a 
                                                 
101 See below. 
102 Dorey, ‘William of Poitiers’, 153. 
103 Poitiers might also be making a moral association between William and Achilles, if the comparison between 
Harold and Hector arises from a judgement that Hector wrongly defends the Trojans against Greece for the 
Trojan theft of a Greek woman. Poitiers characterises Agamemnon and the Greeks as avengers: ‘Ancient Greece 
tells us that Agamemnon of the house of Atreus went to avenge the violation of his brother’s bed …’ (‘Memorat 
antique Graecia Atridem Agamemnona fraternos thalamos ultum ivisse …’): GG, 110–11 (ii.7). 
104 GG, 122–3 (ii.13), quoted above. 
105 ‘Argiorum rex Agamemnon habens in auxilio multos duces atque reges, unicam urbem Priami dolo vix 
evertit obsidionis anno decimo … Subegit autem urbes Anglorum cunctas dux Guillelmus copiis Normanniae 
uno die ab hora tertia in vesperum, non multo extrinsecus adiutorio.’ GG, 142–3 (ii.26); the reference is to 
Virgil, Aeneid, ii, ll 196–8, noted in, GG, 142, n. 2. 
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match for their adversaries. Poitiers anticipates this counterargument, which indicates that he 
is aware of the implications of his own analogies. Several sentences later, he resolves the 
potential conundrum by adding: ‘Even if the walls of Troy had defended [England’s] citadel, 
the strong arm and counsel of such a man would soon have destroyed it.’106 William is 
stronger than the Greek heroes; the English, although a worthy opponent, proved no match 
for William’s forces. 
Not even Aeneas’ worthy Trojan ancestry prevents Poitiers from concluding that Troy 
was, ultimately, a defeated city – one which William would have quickly conquered. Unlike 
Aeneas, William was not escaping a conquered kingdom to found a new one, but rather 
claiming a territory already his by right. By portraying William as founding a dynasty in 
England and defending part of the Normans’ undefeated realm, Poitiers evades the idea that 
William was acquiring a separate kingdom. For Poitiers, the Aeneas and William are 
ultimately engaged upon different enterprises. In choosing his allusions to Aeneas in order to 
create a consistent, coherent picture of William, Poitiers indirectly asserts Norman superiority 
to Rome and the competing realms of Europe. 
 
Harold, William and Theseus: oaths and negligence 
Poitiers’ implicit comparison of William with Theseus is both the most subtle and the most 
moral. Plutarch’s Parallel Lives includes the most comprehensive version of the Theseus 
story. The Gesta’s editors have claimed that Poitiers knew Plutarch’s work,107 but no extant 
Latin manuscript which he might have encountered is known. Poitiers (the place) was a 
centre of classical learning,108 but it is more likely that Poitiers (the man) would have known 
                                                 
106 ‘Si tuerentur eas moenia Troiana, brevi talis viri manus et consilium exscinderint Pergama.’ GG, 142–3 
(ii.26). 
107 Davis and Chibnall, ‘Introduction’, in GG, xvii; Raymonde Foreville, ‘Introduction’, in William of Poitiers, 
Histoire de Guillaume le Conquérant, ed. and trans. Raymonde Foreville (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1952), xxxix. 
108 See Dorey, ‘William of Poitiers’, 140; Orderic Vitalis, Historia Ecclesiastica, 2: 258–61 (iv.ii.217–18). 
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Plutarch’s writing indirectly, as it was not widely available in Latin translation in the West 
until the mid-fifteenth century in Italy.109 Plutarch’s Theseus was nevertheless the fons 
materialis of the Theseus story which had currency in the medieval imagination.110 
Classical versions of the Theseus story vary, many alluding not to Theseus’ heroic 
qualities, but to his recurring traits of betrayal and deceit: his desertion of Ariadne on Naxos, 
his attempt to kidnap Helen and his attempt to capture Persephone from the Underworld.111 A 
frequent and familiar theme was the story of Theseus’ sea voyage from Athens to Crete to 
defeat the Minotaur. On his return Theseus forgets to announce his success with a white sail, 
as he had promised his father, Aegeus.112 Aegeus, distraught on seeing the black sail on the 
horizon, leaps to his death.113 The Theseus story is particularly relevant in the Gesta because 
Poitiers characterises William above all as a vigilant king who never neglects his duty.114 
The Gesta refers frequently to William’s constant vigilance, and examples of how his 
deeds temper or even prevent adversity. Poitiers describes William as the guardian and 
                                                 
109 See Marianne Pade, The Reception of Plutarch’s Lives in Fifteenth-Century Italy. 2 vols. (Copenhagen: 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007), 1: 37 ff.; on Byzantine reception and transmission of Plutarch in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries, see Timothy E. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice. 2nd edn. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 3. 
110 For example, the Aeneid includes several references to Theseus; William of Malmesbury knew of Theseus’ 
adventures on Crete, Gesta regum Anglorum, 1: 288–9 (ii.170.3); Thomas of Britain and Poitiers knew of his 
fateful journeys, discussed below. 
111 e.g. on abandonment of Ariadne, see Catullus 64, in Catullus, Tibullus, Pervigilium Veneris, ed. G. P. Goold. 
2nd edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), 98–127; Ovid, Heroides 10: Ariadne to Theseus, in 
Heriodes, Amores, ed. Grant Showerman and G. P. Goold. New edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1914), 120–33; on Helen, see Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters / Deipnosophistae, ed. S. Douglas 
Olson. 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 6: 230–3; Hyginus, Fabulae, ed. Peter K. 
Marshall (Monachii: K. G. Saur, 2002), 76 (No. 79); on Theseus in the underworld, Hyginus, Fabulae, No. 79; 
Virgil, Aeneid, vi. 
112 In Catullus’ version, which was probably not known to Poitiers, forgetfulness has a different function: 
Ariadne curses Theseus for deserting her (64.135); the curse makes him forget his promise to his father. In this 
variant, he is not morally culpable for his own negligence, and can go on to reign with impunity; unlike Poitiers’ 
defence of a Christian ruler, Catullus makes no moral claim about the particular value of a ruler’s constancy. Cf. 
above discussion of Chrétien; Beer, Narrative Conventions of Truth, 14. 
113 See Theseus, in Plutarch, Lives, ed. Bernadotte Perrin. 11 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1914), 1: 34–5, 44–7 (xvii.4, xxii.1–3); Statius, Thebaid, ed. D. R. Shackleton Bailey and Kathleen M. Coleman. 
2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 2: 294–5 (xii, ll. 625–6). 
114 This is a highly-lauded quality of medieval lords in other narrative sources as well. Harold is described as 
neglecting nothing, Swanton, ed., Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 194–200 (CD 1066); William of Malmesbury 
censures William Rufus for discrediting himself by sacrificing diligentia for neglegentia, Gesta regum 
Anglorum, 1: 560–1 (iv.316.1). 
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caretaker of the religious community in Normandy: ‘How admirable such diligence, how 
worthy of imitation and perpetuation in the ages to come!’115 When William is faced with 
inclement weather on the sea journey to invade England, Poitiers says that he ‘[met] adversity 
with good counsel’, increasing the daily allotment of supplies to put his men at ease.116 
William anticipates need and forgets nothing. 
 Poitiers implicitly compares both William and Harold to Theseus, commending 
William for his vigilance, and condemning Harold for neglect unbefitting a medieval lord. He 
moralises history by employing the imagery of Theseus’s black and white sails and by 
associating the contemporary conquests and sea journeys with Theseus’ journeys to and from 
Crete. In describing Harold’s return to England, Poitiers pauses in his narrative to address 
Harold directly, criticising him for breaking his oath: 
Just a few words, O Harold, will we address to you! With what intent dared you after this 
take William’s inheritance from him and make war on him, when you had with both voice 
and hand subjected yourself and your people to him by a sacrosanct oath? … How 
impious the smooth sea which suffered you, most abominable of men, to be carried on 
your journey to the shore! How perverse was the calm harbour which received you, who 
were bringing the disastrous shipwreck of your native land!117 
It is significant that Poitiers chooses the moment of Harold’s ignominious return to England 
to accuse him. Poitiers could have chosen the moment Harold broke the oath, when he seized 
the crown upon Edward the Confessor’s death. To criticise Harold later, on a sea journey, is a 
                                                 
115 ‘O recolendam, o imitandam, o in omne aeuum propagandam diligentiam!’ GG, 82–3 (i.51). 
116 ‘Quin et consilio adversitatibus obvius, submersorum interitus quantum poterat occultavit, latentius 
tumulando, commeatum in dies augendo, inopiam lenivit.’ GG, 108–11 (ii.6). 
117 ‘Paucis igitur te affabimur Heralde. Qua mente post haec Guillelmo haereditatem auferre, bellum inferre, 
ausus es, cui te gentemque tuam sacrosancto iureiurando subiecisti tua et lingua et manu? … Impie clemens 
pontus qui vehentem te hominem teterrimum ad littus provehi passus est. Sinistre placida statio fuit quae recepit 
te naufragium miserrimum patriae afferentem.’ GG, 76–9 (i.46); see also 68–79 (i.41–6). The shipwreck image 
could refer to the Pauline nautical metaphors in 1 Tim. 1:19. 
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rhetorically elegant choice: it enables Poitiers to draw an analogy to Theseus’s fateful sea 
journey. 
 Poitiers invokes the story of Theseus in direct address to Harold: ‘How unfortunate 
were the following winds which filled your black sails on the way home!’118 Poitiers’ allusion 
is not primarily to the black sail’s intended use, but rather to the ignominy Theseus incurs by 
flying the black sail in violation of his promise to his father. For Poitiers, the hero’s intention 
is irrelevant: what connects Theseus and Harold morally is the disastrous outcome of a 
broken promise. Theseus had his father’s blood on his head, because Aegeus would not have 
killed himself had Theseus kept his promise. Statius’ Thebaid – which Poitiers also knew119 – 
notes this moral implication explicitly, invoking the ‘false sail’ which precipitated Aegeus’ 
death.120 Theseus, like Harold, forgot his promise, neglected his duty, and sailed home 
imagining himself victorious – but under a black sail. 
 The choice of this moment and this analogy enables Poitiers to establish the contrast 
he creates later in his narrative. He portrays William using white sails, with which Theseus 
had promised to announce his victory, thereby drawing a tacit parallel to Theseus and 
showing William as the more worthy leader. After William conquers England, he prepares to 
return victorious to Normandy: 
The ships were waiting, all ready for the crossing; it had seemed fit to equip 
them with white sails in the manner of the ancients, for they were to carry back a 
most glorious triumph and to announce the greatest joy that could have been 
desired.121 
                                                 
118 ‘Infeliciter secundi flatus, qui nigerrimis velis tuis aspiraverunt redeuntibus.’ GG, 76–9 (i.46). Meanings of 
‘nigerrimus’ include black, dark and ill-fated, which resonate with the story Poitiers is telling. 
119 See GG, 136–7 (ii.22); and the comments of Davis and Chibnall, GG, 189. 
120 ‘unde vagi casurum in nomina ponti / Cresia decepit falso ratis Aegea velo’ [emphasis added], Statius, 
Thebaid, xii.625–6. This passage is not noted in the edition of GG. 
121 ‘Stabant naves ad transmittendum paratissimae, quas vere decuerat albis velis more veterum adormatas 
esse. Erant enim revecturae gloriosissimum triumphum, nunciaturae maxime optatum gaudium.’ GG, 166–7 
(ii.38). Davis and Chibnall, 166, n. 2, note that this and the reference in i.46 are likely to the Theseus legend. 
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For Poitiers, the white sail highlights William’s foresight, respect and awareness of tradition, 
qualities which Theseus and Harold do not share: William succeeds where the others fail. 
Poitiers was not the only medieval writer to find the Theseus story well-suited to 
illustrate the consequences of deception, whether by negligence or by design. In Thomas of 
Britain’s Tristan of around 1170, a white sail is meant to indicate that Yseut has come to heal 
the hero’s wounds, whereas a black sail would indicate her refusal to return. What transpires 
is that Tristan’s jealous wife gives a vindictively false report that the ship carries black sails, 
causing Tristan to despair and die.122 This parallel example suggests that the association of 
black sails with deception and neglect of promises may have been more widespread in the 
medieval imagination – and not simply stylistically useful to Poitiers. The Tristan story 
further highlights the point that Poitiers’s allusion is not to Theseus’ intent, but rather to his 
actions and their effects – his failure to honour a promise and its tragic consequences. The 
allusion takes on contemporary moral relevance in Poitiers’s assessment of Harold. 
Theseus’ negligence may not have prevented him from being a hero in a classical age, 
but negligence was a major flaw in an era of feudal obligations. Most significant for Poitiers’ 
argument, negligence was not a valid excuse for a moral infraction.123 Through the Theseus 
story, Poitiers found subtle rhetorical support for his condemnation of Harold and his 
approval of William’s authority as a king. 
Harold breaks his oath deliberately. Theseus breaks his oath unintentionally. Poitiers 
would have us believe that William would not break his oath. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
122 Norris J. Lacy, ed., Early French Tristan Poems. 2 vols. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1998), 2: ll. 2558–66, 
3022–39. 
123 But cf. Peter Abelard, for whom intent was particularly important in evaluating morality: D.E. Luscombe, ed. 
and trans., Peter Abelard’s Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 12–13, 22–3. On the theme of 
accountability regardless of intent in the Middle Ages, see e.g. R. Howard Bloch, Medieval French Literature 
and Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 32. 
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Because the Norman claim to the English throne was in contention, Norman advocates had to 
justify William’s actions to posterity. Poitiers uses classical models of great leaders to give 
William a worthy lineage by example. Yet he also uses them to provide contrast to his 
rhetorical argument for William’s ideal kingship – characterised by vigilance, fulfilment of 
his duties, and military prowess – and his promise for the future. Poitiers’ narrative reveals 
both his knowledge of classical material regarding Caesar, Aeneas and Theseus and his re-
interpretation of historic accounts of conquest and naval enterprise. Together, these enable 
him to evaluate the classical heroes in his contemporary worldview and to judge them 
accordingly. By Poitiers’ verdict, William emerges as the ideal king who has earned the right 
to rule England without shame or dishonour. 
Poitiers’ Gesta is a crucial case study of both Norman Conquest narratives, and the 
nature and forms of medieval classicism. Poitiers was not alone as a classically minded 
commentator: the Bayeux Tapestry and the Carmen de Hastingae proelio wove classical 
allusion into the very substance of their Norman Conquest narratives.124 Yet Poitiers differs 
from them substantially in using these allusions to sustain a moral argument for William’s 
rule, which shows that Poitiers was in direct political dialogue with the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle, the Carmen and detractors of the Conquest in greater Europe.125 To invoke the 
classical past had implications beyond the purely literary or decorative. The ways in which 
Poitiers reviewed and revised it reveal that he found in it potent meanings and morals 
relevant to the political and intellectual milieu of his day. 
Classicist and champion of Norman identity though he was, Poitiers did not take 
Trojan origins for granted, nor did he accept them without considering their consequences. 
He was worried about their implications, a mindset to which the presence, absence and 
                                                 
124 See e.g. Heslop, ‘Regarding the Spectators of the Bayeux Tapestry; van Houts, ‘Latin Poetry and the Anglo-
Norman Court.’ 
125 Cf. van Houts, ‘Norman Conquest through European Eyes’; see above. 
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progression of his references to Troy in the Gesta attest. Despite the pan-European rhetorical 
competition for Trojan origins in medieval chronicles, Troy’s defeat was an inconvenient 
truth in Poitiers’ project of justifying and exalting its opposites: conquest and victory. What 
this suggests is that negative associations with Troy could be just as important to a medieval 
writer as was Troy’s hold on the medieval imagination. Within a given medieval narrative, 
the relative value of different aspects of the classical past was subject to change based on the 
author’s motivations. Susan Reynolds has suggested that medieval stories of common descent 
from Troy offer evidence for medieval writers’ interest in the unity and solidarity of a 
people.126 As Poitiers’ classicism indicates, in an era of conquest – and of the joining of 
previously separate realms under one crown – both commentators and their audiences would 
have been keenly aware of factors that might stand in the way of unity. 
In the Gesta, classical allusions have a specific and consequential function beyond 
that of decoration: Poitiers uses them to strengthen the narrative structure of contingency, and 
to convey the political import of language. For Poitiers, the course of his narrative was as 
important as – if not more important than – the fact of including references to classical 
authority. As a panegyrist, he makes ‘outdoing’ comparisons, but he also tightly constructs 
the flow of narrative time. His classical references, and the ways in which they repeat or 
change to present a coherent narrative, provide evidence for his awareness that what comes 
after depends upon what comes before. These allusions speak to the value which Poitiers and 
his intended audience would have placed on oaths. The Gesta reveals a preoccupation with 
the moral content of words, a content shown in a man’s actions and their consequences for 
people, patria and the fate of the man himself who acts – or fails to act – as he should. In 
crafting his story thus, Poitiers sustains an intimate harmony between classical precedent and 
his arguments for William’s legitimacy and Harold’s perjury. 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Reynolds, ‘Medieval Origines gentium’, especially 381. 
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We should not forget the inspirational and aspirational qualities of classical learning 
beyond the realm of narrative. The compelling nature of classical stories meant they were at 
times seen as dangerous and distracting, or at least in need of justification, as the remarks of 
the well-read classical scholar William of Malmesbury suggest.127 But these stories also had 
the potential to provide inspiration to rulers, writers, knights and clerics, whether in the form 
of making grander conquests, or seeking to capture in writing the moral spirit of a people and 
an age with the greatest possible precision and narrative depth. 
The mounting evidence that Norman exploits worthy of classical heroes were 
happening in the present reinforced the belief not only that God was on the Normans’ side, 
but also that to portray William as a classical hero for a Christian age was to render truth in 
writing. The fact and the scale of the Normans’ military successes indicated to the Normans 
that they were justified in thinking of themselves as new, better and modern Caesars. 
Moreover, events seemed to confirm repeatedly that they, as Normans, were particularly 
entitled to do so. Within William’s lifetime, the Normans had dramatically expanded their 
influence and hegemony within and beyond Europe. Poitiers certainly knew this, and 
associated Norman ventures with those of Rome. Poitiers claims that Rome would have 
rejoiced to have produced William. Immediately thereafter, he lists the imperial exploits of 
William’s Norman knights in Apulia, Sicily, Constantinople and Babylon, and implies that 
the word imperator should be applied to William.128 
William and his retinue also knew of the Normans’ comprehensive successes, and 
could well have thought of themselves in relation to classical heroes, adventures and 
conquests long before Poitiers set out William’s deeds in writing. Men in William’s court – 
Odo and Poitiers among them – were familiar with the classics and would have shared an 
                                                 
127 In his Polyhistor, William of Malmesbury defended himself to his contemporaries for his interest in the 
classics: see Thomson, William of Malmesbury, 28–9, 52; on this recurring theme in the Middle Ages, see 
Morse, Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages, 8–10, 18–20. 
128 GG, 156–7 (ii.32); see also Bates, Normans and Empire, 64–92. 
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ability to recognise or to draw parallels with their present era. Memorising texts and stories 
was a critical element of this education. Poitiers placed rhetorical emphasis on the spoken 
word: it is equally plausible that his emphasis is historical as well, if the Normans self-
consciously performed in the manner of the ancients. Poitiers’ Gesta probably represents with 
some truth the way in which William and his companions imagined themselves and their role 
in the making of history. As Campbell observed, Einhard’s Life of Charlemagne may reflect a 
sincere representation Charlemagne’s own conscious classicism in content, as much as it 
reflects as much as Einhard’s decision to frame his narrative with classical rhetoric in 
structure.129 We cannot prove that William thought of Caesar’s victory banner and 
proclaimed the famed words on the battlefield to his comrades. Yet it is the sort of thing he 
might well have done – and for which he, like Poitiers, would surely have had a receptive and 
comprehending audience. 
The case of the Gesta Guillelmi confirms that the proliferation of the classics in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries was more than rebirth or renaissance: it is evidence of a 
sustained evolution of literary techniques and moral values. Poitiers’ Norman Conquest was a 
venture not only across the Channel, but also into the classical past. Poitiers forged an 
alliance between classical allusion and moralising history aimed at a wide audience. The case 
of his far-ranging yet targeted narrative is a testament to the need to maintain a heightened 
awareness in reading and interpreting classical allusions in the long twelfth century. We are 
finding, more and more, that calculated classicism in the Middle Ages provided not a 
flourish, but rather a foundation for moralising the past. 
As for the Gesta Guillelmi, the only superficiality it possesses is that which later 
historians have imposed upon the text. The classical brilliance of the Gesta does not obscure 
                                                 
129 James Campbell, ‘Asser’s Life of Alfred’, in idem, The Anglo-Saxon State (London: Hambledon and 
London, 2000), 129–55 (149). 
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the stuff of the past, but rather illuminates the full range of morals, aims, lies, disputes and 
hopes keenly felt in the years following 1066 – and historians, as well as literary scholars, 
would do well to take note. Poitiers’ Norman Conquest of the classical past succeeds in 
representing a past, a present and a reality which he and his contemporaries imagined to be 
true, and an Anglo-Norman future which they hoped would prove true. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, the participants of the 2009 Haskins Society 
Conference at Boston College and the attendees of the Church and Culture Seminar at the 
University of Oxford, who provided numerous insightful comments and suggestions on 
earlier versions of this paper. I wish to acknowledge David Bates, Patrick Healy, Laura Ashe, 
Chris Lewis, Chris Wickham and Simon Costa for their guidance and for reading drafts. 
 
Emily A. Winkler is  the John Cowdrey Junior Research Fellow in History at St Edmund 
Hall, University of Oxford, and Teaching Fellow in the Department of History at University 
College London. She works primarily on historical writing, political thought and the 
reception of the classics in the central Middle Ages. Her book on royal responsibility and 
conquest narratives in Anglo-Norman historical writing is under contract with Oxford 
University Press. 
